2011-03-17
Questions and answers about nuclear safety
Questions presented to Fortum regarding nuclear safety and the safety
of the Loviisa nuclear power plant are included below along with the
answers to them.
1) A serious nuclear power plant accident that has released
radioactivity into the environment has occurred in Japan. How is it
possible that this kind of accident has happened even though it was
known that earthquakes can happen in Japan and that they can cause
tsunamis?
Behind Japan’s nuclear power plant accident was the exceptionally
strong and long-lasting earthquake that happened on Friday, 3 March
2011. According to the information in the media, the tsunami following
the earthquake crippled a large part of the plants’ safety systems.
Risk assessment is an integral part of the design process of a nuclear
power plant. The assessment is used to prepare for various internal and
external threats potentially endangering the plant’s safety. Fortum
does not have comprehensive information on the safety systems and
design principles of the plants in Japan; therefore, at this point, it
is impossible to evaluate all the factors that contributed to the
accident.
2) Is it possible that a similar accident could happen in a Finnish
nuclear power plant?
The nuclear power plant accident in Japan was caused by a very strong
earthquake and the tsunami that followed. Due to Finland’s geographical
location, a similar initiating event is impossible. Serious reactor
accidents caused by other reasons are possible also in Finland, and
comprehensive measures in preparation for such events have been
undertaken at Finnish plants over several decades.
The Loviisa power plant has prepared for a wide range of internal and
external hazards that could lead to reactor core damage. External
hazards include e.g.:
- Earthquakes, although the risks are small in Finland due to low
seismic activity
- Fires, analysing potential damage on a room-by-room basis
- Floods caused by pipe breakages and equipment malfunctions
- Strong winds, including tornadoes and downbursts
- High and low sea-water level
- Heavy algae concentration, frazil ice, and heavy or freezing snowfall
as a single phenomenon and in conjunction with strong wind
- Oil transports
as well as many other events, taking into consideration also situations
when the plant is not operating at full capacity or is in outage status.
3) What is the risk of an accident at Loviisa?
Based on a full scope risk analysis, the probability of reactor core
damage of Loviisa’s number one unit is 4.6x10-5 per year, i.e. less
frequent than once every 20,000 years. Fortum engages in continuous
research and development work to lower the risk level further.
Additionally, Loviisa’s power plant has a management strategy in place
for a serious reactor accident so that core damage would not release
emissions into the environment (see question 4).
4) How is Loviisa prepared for a severe reactor accident?
A severe reactor accident refers to an accident in which the nuclear
power plant’s reactor core is fully or partially damaged. Severe
reactor accidents were not included in the original design basis of the
Loviisa power plant. As safety-awareness has evolved, the plant has
been modernized and the plant has implemented a severe accident
management strategy aiming to protect human health and safety and to
prevent the long-term pollution of extensive land and water areas in
the event of reactor core damage. Preparedness for severe accidents and
their management is continuously maintained and developed.
Several management systems are used in management of severe accidents;
the most important of these systems are described below.
CONTAINMENT BUILDING
The purpose of the containment building is to prevent the release of
radioactive materials into the environment in an accident situation.
The containment building can significantly mitigate the consequences of
an accident, and that is why it is especially important that the
integrity and leak-tightness of the containment building be maintained
in an accident situation. It is critical to tightly close the pipelines
and other lead-throughs penetrating the containment building.
PRIMARY CIRCUIT PRESSURE REDUCTION
The possibility of reducing pressure in the primary circuit is an
essential safety function in severe accidents in situations where the
reactor’s residual heat cannot be transferred normally to the secondary
circuit. Reducing pressure in the primary circuit ensures successful
cooling of the core and prevents the reactor pressure vessel from
rupturing under high pressure.
CONTROLLED HYDROGEN REMOVAL
If the fuel rods overheat, a chemical reaction is initiated between the
water and the cladding of the fuel rods; the chemical reaction produces
a large amount of hydrogen. Hydrogen gas is directed from the reactor
to the containment building e.g. through depressurization of the
primary circuit or a possible leak. Hydrogen gas is explosive in high
concentrations when it comes into contact with oxygen. If the hydrogen
is not removed in a controlled manner throughout the accident, the
integrity of the containment building can be jeopardized.
At the Loviisa power plant hydrogen generated in an accident situation
is controlled with ice condensers, hydrogen recombiners and glow plugs
(see question 8).
COOLING OF THE REACTOR PRESSURE VESSEL AND THE CONTAINMENT BUILDING
External cooling of the reactor pressure vessel ensures the integrity
of the pressure vessel throughout the accident also in the event of a
fuel meltdown. The core remnants are retained and cooled inside the
pressure vessel, thus avoiding a loss of integrity of the containment
building as a result of events related to a rupture in the reactor
pressure vessel.
The containment building’s external spray system prevents damage to the
containment building caused by excess pressure in a severe reactor
accident. The containment building’s external spay system is powered by
a separate diesel engine. If needed, fire engine equipment can be used
to spray the containment building.
5) What happens if the connection to external power grid and the
auxiliary diesel engines at Loviisa NPP are lost? What preparations
have been made to cope in cases of disruptions to the power supply at
Loviisa NPP?
Below is a description of how the power supply takes place at the
Loviisa power plant in normal conditions, in malfunction situations,
and the preparations made in case of a total loss of power supply.
POWER SUPPLY IN NORMAL OPERATING CONDITIONS
During the plant’s power operation, the electrical power needed for the
plant’s own use and safety systems comes from the plant’s main
generators. In other situations, electrical power can be taken from an
external 400-kV or 110-kV grid. There are two connections to the 400-kV
grid.
POWER SUPPLY IN MALFUNCTION SITUATIONS
If the power supply from the plant’s main generator and the external
grid has been lost, the emergency diesel generators will start; each
plant unit has four emergency diesel generators. The diesel generators
also charge the batteries that provide the back-up power for the
automation systems.
PREPARATIONS FOR TOTAL LOSS OF POWER SUPPLY
The plant has also prepared for a situation in which the power supply
from the main generators, the external grid, and the emergency diesel
generators has been lost. In this case, the power supply from the
110-kV grid can be substituted with the Fingrid gas turbine located in
the plant area. The gas turbine eventually will be replaced with
Fortum’s own diesel generator, which is under construction. Power can
be supplied also from another plant unit. Additionally, there is the
possibility to supply electricity for the plant’s safety systems from
the nearby Ahvenkoski hydropower plant using a 20-kV power line
reserved for this purpose.
For severe accidents, the plant also has two additional air-cooled
diesel generators. They are placed in separate location from the
seawater-cooled emergency diesel generators. These diesel generators
can be used when needed also for charging all the batteries that are
important for safety.
If necessary, the electric-power water pumps needed in the cooling of
the reactor can be replaced also with fixedly installed diesel
engine-powered pumps, which can also operate when all power supply to
the plant has been lost.
6) How has Loviisa plant prepared for a sudden rise in the sea
level? Could the sea level at Loviisa rise above the design bases? How
have you ensured that the design bases are correct?
The elevation of Loviisa power plant yard area is +3.00 meters.
Studies show that the threat of a high sea level will not occur
suddenly, it will be predictable. The occurrence of a high sea level at
Loviisa requires heavy storms to rage in the North Sea for a long
period of time – typically a couple of weeks – resulting in an
exceptionally large volume of water flowing through the Strait of
Denmark into the Baltic Sea. Strong south-western and western winds
over the Baltic Sea, lasting several days, will have to push water from
the central areas of the sea into the Gulf of Finland. If additionally
there is high pressure over the Baltic Sea and low pressure over the
Loviisa area, the pressure difference will raise the sea level at
Loviisa. Spillover (the bathtub effect) of the water level in the Gulf
of Finland can also raise the water level locally. The tidewater effect
caused by the moon also has a small impact.
The Finnish Institute of Marine Research has estimated that, as a
result of the above-mentioned phenomena, the maximum explainable water
level at Loviisa is +213 cm. The Gudrun storm on 9 January 2005 raised
the sea level at Loviisa to +177 cm, according to the Finnish Institute
of Marine Research.
Because a high sea level can be predicted, the Loviisa plant has
anticipatory sea-level monitoring and operating instructions in place
in the event of high sea levels. Additionally, it has been agreed that
the relevant authorities will provide the Loviisa power plant’s control
room with a separate preliminary warning of a high sea level.
7) If the sea level rises more than three meters, what are the
consequences?
Even if the seawater level were to rise somewhat over three meters and
cover Hästholmen island, where the power plant is located, the reactor
can be cooled using the diesel-powered pumps that do not require
electricity. The probability of a sea level this high is very small.
The Loviisa power plant is developing flood preparedness in the
long-term.
The reactor core in both Loviisa power plant units is located 10 meters
above sea level inside a gas- and water-tight containment building.
Thus the seawater could not directly flood the interior of the
containment building.
8) How has Loviisa prepared for hydrogen diffusion?
Loviisa has prepared for a situation in a severe accident in which a
lot of hydrogen gas can be generated in the reactor core when the fuel
cladding overheats and reacts with steam. Hydrogen control at Loviisa
is based on hydrogen removal using different means as effectively as
possible as soon as it has been released into the containment building.
Hydrogen gas is directed from the reactor to the containment building
e.g. through depressurization of the primary circuit or a possible
leak. Hydrogen gas is explosive in high concentrations when it comes
into contact with oxygen. If the hydrogen is not removed in a
controlled manner throughout the accident, the integrity of the
containment building can be jeopardized.
At the Loviisa power plant hydrogen generated in an accident situation
is controlled with ice condensers, hydrogen recombiners and glow plugs.
In exceptional situations, the ice condensers are used to mix the
hydrogen accumulated in the containment building into the large air
volume within the containment building; at the same time, the pressure
in the containment building decreases when the ice melts.
The hydrogen mixed in the air space of the containment building is
removed in a controlled manner with hydrogen recombiners installed in
the containment building. Hydrogen and oxygen react chemically in the
hydrogen recombiners, forming water and heat from the hydrogen and the
oxygen contained in the air. Hydrogen recombiners are completely
passive and operate without electricity or control systems.
The containment building also has a separately installed glow-plug
system, which can be used in situations where the generation of
hydrogen is momentarily and locally so strong that mixing it with
oxygen and the recombining of hydrogen cannot guarantee sufficiently
low concentrations of hydrogen. With the glow plugs, locally high
concentrations of hydrogen can be burned in a controlled manner without
jeopardizing the integrity of the containment building.
9) Why don’t the old reactors have to fulfil the same safety
requirements as the new ones?
Authorities define the safety requirements for nuclear power plants.
The authority in Finland is the Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety
Authority (STUK). The requirements are based on comprehensive risk
analyses and are set at an acceptable risk level based on the best
available information. Safety requirements have been further tightened
over the years. It is practically impossible to realize all the
requirements set for new plants in the old plants. However, the plant’s
safety systems have been improved in many ways over the years.
10) What kinds of safety improvements have been made at Loviisa over
the years?
As described in the answer to question 4, numerous plant modifications
have been made at the Loviisa power plant to manage severe accidents.
Some other examples of safety improvements made over the years include:
- Cooling system upgrades for instrumentation spaces
- New floor drain filters in the containment building
- New primary safety valves
- Risk of core damage caused by flooding has been reduced by raising
the height of the flood threshold, preventing seawater from reaching
the lower spaces of the reactor building in the event of flooding in
the turbine hall
- Securing the heat sink
- Back-up residual heat removal system
- Securing cooling for diesel generators
By implementing these and similar measures, it has been possible to
continuously reduce the plant’s core damage frequency, as shown in the
illustration below:
Loviisa 1: Relative decrease in the probability of a severe reactor
accident as a result of safety improvements
11) How is Fortum’s Loviisa power plant monitored?
The Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK) continuously
monitors the operation of the Loviisa power plant. STUK has appointed a
local inspector for the power plant; the inspector works at the plant
permanently, monitoring and supervising the operations at Loviisa.
Additionally, Fortum provides STUK with e.g. a daily 24-hour report on
the plant’s operations. There are hundreds of radiation monitoring
stations in and around the plant. All radioactivity analyses of
environmental samples are done at STUK’s environmental laboratory. In
all, about 500 radioactivity analyses are done annually at STUK’s
laboratory in addition to the power plant’s own, continuous radiation
measurements and the dose measurements done on individuals. STUK
requires extensive intermediate safety assessments as a part of the
operating licence.
Loviisa power plant operations are also monitored by the European
Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) and the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA). They particularly monitor the handling of nuclear
material at the plant. Power companies also carry out peer reviews to
share best practices.
12) How has the Loviisa nuclear power plant prepared for oil
accidents?
The Loviisa power plant has prepared for oil accidents on the Gulf of
Finland. The measures to be implemented at the plant depend on the
plant’s operational status and the location of the oil spill. If
needed, the plant in operating status is shut down and the cooling
water intake is switched to the discharge side, which is on the
opposite side of the island on which the power plant is located.
In the event of a major oil spill, oil can reach also this water intake
location. In this case, it is possible to switch to use of the plant
site internal cooling water circulation. It is possible to continue
with this cooling method for about 24 hours.
The water in internal cooling circulation will gradually heat up. If it
is still not possible to take cooling water from the sea, the plant can
be cooled by releasing clean steam from the secondary circuit into the
atmosphere. This can be continued for several days without the need for
additional water. If the problem situation were to continue, clean
water could be transported to the plant. About 20 cubic meters of water
per hour is needed.
If the plant is going through an annual outage when an oil accident
occurs, the need for cooling water is inherently smaller. In this case,
the same measures are used up to the internal cooling circulation.
Releasing steam can’t be used in all phases of the annual outage, but
the measure can be taken into use in approximately 24 hours, regardless
of the phase of the annual outage.
If, in spite of all the cautionary measures, oily seawater has entered
the cooling systems, the plant must be cooled using the above-described
release of steam into the atmosphere, and the necessary cleaning
measures must be initiated.
As part of the long-term safety improvements, Fortum is designing a
parallel cooling system for the seawater cooling. This will further
improve safety, particularly during plant outages, in the event of oil
spills and also e.g. heavy algae concentrations.